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Abstract 
 
The paper examines earnings inequality and earnings returns to education in China among four 
types of workers characterized by their labor market history. Compared to workers staying in the 
state sector, early market entrants no longer enjoyed advantages. The commonly observed higher 
earnings returns to education in the market sector are only limited to recent market entrants. This 
results from the aggregation of two very different types of workers: those who were “pushed” 
and those who “jumped” into the market in later stage of the reform. The findings challenge the 
prevailing wisdom that education is necessarily more highly rewarded by the market sector.  
 
 
Key words: Labor Market, Earnings, Education, China’s Transition 
                                                 
* We thank Donald Treiman for making the data available to us. The research was supported to 
Wu by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Mellon Foundation. Comments are welcome. Please 
direct all correspondence to Xiaogang Wu (email: xgwu@isr.umich.edu), Population Studies 
Center, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., PO Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
 
 
   
Non-Technical Summary 
 
Previous work on the market transition debate in sociology has missed the direct link between 
individuals’ labor market histories and individuals’ labor market outcomes. In this paper we 
develop a typology of workers based on their labor market histories: the first type refers to those 
who were in the state sector initially and have continued to stay there (“stayers”). The second 
type (“later entrants”) describes those who began in the state sector but later transferred to the 
market sector. The third type (“market losers”) includes those who initially were in the market 
sector but later retreated to the state sector. The last type (“early birds”) consists of those who 
entered the market early and have stayed there. We proposed a model of selective transition of 
workers from the state sector to the market sector, and derived several hypotheses in regard to 
earnings inequality and earnings returns to education among these four types of workers. 
Our empirical analyses are based on the survey of “Life Histories and Social Change in 
Contemporary China” (1996), a multi-stage stratified national probability sample of 6,090 adults 
aged 20-69 from all regions of China (except Tibet). We use the urban half of the sample to 
investigate the process of labor market transitions in the period between 1987 and 1996. We 
selected 1987 as the benchmark year because the urban economic reform was initiated in 1986. 
Prior to 1986, private economy and urban labor markets were almost nonexistent, and few 
workers had transferred from the state to the market sectors.  
Although our results confirm the prevailing wisdom that returns to education are higher 
in the market sector than in the state sector, no differences, in either earnings or returns to 
education in 1996, have been found between early birds in the market sector and stayers in the 
state sector. Instead, the observed differences are limited to later market entrants. These findings 
run counter to the claim that market mechanisms per se lead to high returns to human capital and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
 
 
   
indicate the need a better understanding of the dynamic processes of social actors during market 
transition. Workers entering the market sector in the initial stage of the urban economic reform 
no longer enjoyed advantages in either earnings or returns to education in 1996. The major 
winners in the market transition are later market entrants.  
Further analysis provides an alternative explanation for the higher returns to education 
for later market entrants. After disaggregating the two types of later entrants -- those who were 
“pushed” and those who “jumped” into the market sector -- and correcting selection biases, we 
find no significant difference in returns to education among voluntary entrants, involuntary 
entrants, and workers staying in the state sector. We conclude that higher returns to education in 
the market sector of a transition economy cannot be construed as caused by marketization per se, 
and that the sorting process of workers in labor markets helps explain the results.  
Our findings suggest that researchers should reconsider the implications drawn from 
sectoral comparisons in addressing the social consequences of market transition in China. While 
the argument that the institutional structure of an economy is important in determining social 
stratification outcomes is undisputed, sectoral distinctions do not necessarily lead to the 
difference in economic returns to education. Vice versa, without critically examining the labor 
market conditions, imputing the institutional significance from the sectoral differences in returns 
to education is unwarranted. Furthermore, researchers should also be cautious when interpreting 
the temporal trend of returns to education in the reform era. The increase in the role of education 
as an earnings determinant could result from the changing sectoral composition of the economy 
and workers’ increasing mobility into the market sector over time, rather than marketization per 
se. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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Does the Market Pay Off? 
Earnings Inequality and Returns to Education in Urban China 
 
The relationship between earnings and education in market economies is well known: human 
capital theory explains that a large gradation in earnings by education reflects returns to 
individuals’ investment in education (Becker 1993; Mincer 1974). Thus, low earnings returns to 
education in redistributive economies, observed for pre-reform China, may be attributed to the 
absence of markets (e.g., Peng 1992; Walder 1990; Whyte and Parish 1984; Xie and Hannum 
1996; Zhao and Zhou 2001). Scholars of state socialism have long observed that economic 
resources were allocated primarily according to bureaucratic principles under redistributive 
economies, in which political loyalty rather than economic productivity was the basis of reward 
(Polanyi 1957; Szelenyi 1978, 1983). One of the principal structural changes following the post-
socialist transformation has been the gradual replacement of the market as the principal agent of 
social stratification. This notable change has led some theorists to predict an increase in the 
importance of market credentials (such as education) and a decrease in the importance of 
political factors as determinants of earnings in transition economies (Cao and Nee 2000; Nee 
1989, 1991, 1996; Nee and Matthews 1996). This assertion on market transition has contributed 
to a lively debate among sociologists studying institutional transformation and social 
stratification in former state socialist societies (Bian and Logan 1996; Gerber and Hout 1998; 
Oberschall 1996; Parish and Michelson 1996; Rona-Tas 1994; Szelenyi and Kostello 1996; 
Walder 1996; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhou 2000a).   
Controversies are mainly focused on whether the importance of redistributive power has 
declined in the post-socialist era. Several competing theses, such as “power persistence” (Bian William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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and Logan 1996; Nee 1991) and “power conversion” (Rona-Tas 1994; Hankiss 1990; Staniszkis 
1991), have been proposed to account for advantages held by cadres and party members in 
transition economies (also see Gerber 2000, 2001; Lin 1995; Oi 1992; Rona-Tas and Guseva 
2001;Walder 1996). Empirical studies on urban China have reported an upward trend in 
income/earnings returns to human capital, particularly to education (Bian and Logan 1996; 
Hauser and Xie 2001; Zhou 2000a), while cross-sectional studies have found higher returns to 
education in the market sector than in the state sector (Knight and Song 1993; Tang and Parish 
2000; Wu 2002a; Zhao and Zhou 2001). Thus, the evidence appears to support the claim that 
“the transition to a market-like economy should result in higher return to human capital 
characteristics.”(Nee 1989: 674).  
The prevailing wisdom is to attribute (either wittingly or unwittingly) the increasing 
returns to education to market transitions, even among those who do not accept “the-declining-
influence-of-redistribution” thesis. For example, Bian and Logan (1996:755) assert: “we found 
clear signs of the impacts of market transition...Education, correspondingly, has become more 
important as a predictor of income.” Similarly, Zhou (2000a: 1166-67) argues that, because the 
role of education reflects the distinctive institutional logic in different economies, “increasing 
returns to education may be partly attributed to emerging labor markets that better realize values 
of human capital than before...Increasing returns to education in the reform era clearly reflect the 
increasing importance of human capital in market transitions.” This apparent agreement has led 
Nee and his associate (Cao and Nee 2000) to claim that the emergence of market institutions has 
caused “higher returns to human capital than under a centrally planned economy.”  
Yet, the same empirical observations may be subject to alternative interpretations. 
Education, be it the proxy of human capital or credentials, was also highly rewarded under the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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socialist stratification system (Konrad and Szelenyi 1979; Szelenyi 1988; Walder 1995; Walder, 
Li and Treiman 2000; Wu 2001). Zhou (2000b: 1192), in the rejoinder to Cao and Nee (2000), 
contends that high returns to education could be an outcome of interplay between redistribution 
and markets. Noting the government’s emphasis on human capital in wage policies in the early 
1980s, Zhou (2000b: 1193) speculates that increasing returns to human capital (education) in 
reform-era China’s may reflect “the compound effects of political processes and marketization.” 
Without a substantive understanding of how human capital is allocated in the specific 
institutional context, high returns to human capital cannot be interpreted as caused by market 
mechanisms. 
We use Zhou’s remark as our starting point to move beyond the debate framed by Nee’s 
market transition theory. In this paper, by incorporating individuals’ labor market histories in 
examining earnings inequality and earnings returns to education among individual workers in 
transition China, we aim to offer a micro perspective on how the sorting process of workers into 
labor markets shapes labor market outcomes (i.e., earnings). Rather than attributing higher 
returns to education in the market sector than in the state sector as resulting from more 
efficiently operated market mechanisms per se, we propose a model of selective mobility of 
workers from the state sector to the market sector as an alternative explanation. 
 
Earnings Inequality and Returns to Education in China’s Transition Economy 
China started its economic reforms in 1978, initially in rural areas, and beginning in 1986, 
expanded it to urban areas. The past two decades have witnessed rapid economic growth and 
enormous social changes in the most populous nation in the world. From 1978 to 1996 China’s 
GDP has almost quadrupled, with a nearly 10 percent annual growth rate. The greatest William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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beneficiaries of the growth and prosperity are Chinese people, whose living standards have 
improved significantly. The per capita living space has more than doubled in urban areas, and 
total household bank deposits, measured against the GDP, increased from less than 6 percent in 
1978 to more than 60 percent in 1996 (Qian 1999; SSB 1997).  
However, not all Chinese have equally benefited from the economic reform. This 
phenomenal growth in prosperity, accompanied as it was by the dismantling of traditional 
socialist welfare and security systems, has resulted in rising inequalities in income (e.g., Griffin 
and Zhao 1993; Hauser and Xie 2001 ; Zhao and Zhou 2001). From 1988 to 1995, for example, 
the Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, increased from 0.233 to 0.322 in urban 
China, and from 0.338 to 0.416 in rural China (see summary in Hauser and Xie [2001]). The 
image of egalitarian Chinese socialism is no longer the reality.  
A large body of literature, mostly in economics, addresses the trend of income 
inequalities in China since 1978 (Adelman and Sunding 1987; Byron and Manaloto 1990; Griffin 
and Zhao 1993; Hsiung and Putterman 1989; Khan et. al. 1992; Khan and Riskin 1998; Knight 
and Song 1993; Zhao 1993). Sociologists, however, have been more interested in the relocations 
of people in the changing social structure -- that is, who wins and who loses during the 
transition. In the reform era, researchers have continued to observe positive returns to both 
political capital (such as party membership) and human capital (such as education) (Bian and 
Logan 1996; Walder 1990; Xie and Hannum 1996), and the role of both factors seems to have 
increased over time (Hauser and Xie 2001; Zhou 2000a; see summary in Zhao and Zhou 2001: 
Table 2).  
To what extent are these observations attributable to marketization per se? The studies 
have been inconclusive so far. For instance, income distribution has experienced a U-shape William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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trajectory in all former state socialism countries: income inequality declined in the early reform 
era but increased later. Although some scholars argued that the emergence of market economies 
brought about the decline (Nee 1989; Szelenyi 1978, 1983),
1 variations in income inequality 
could instead result from the state egalitarian policy designed to win support of the working class 
for the reform (Bian and Logan 1996:755). Increasing returns to education within the public 
sector (Zhou 2000a), which has been immune to marketization until recently, can hardly be 
attributed to marketization.  
The difficulty lies in the operationalization of markets. Xie and Hannum (1996) 
approximated “marketization” with regional economic growth rate and found returns to human 
capital (schooling) were negatively associated with marketization.
2 Parish and Michelson (1996), 
Nee (1996), and Nee and Cao (1999) developed a typology of regions (grouped on the basis of 
provinces) to approximate the local context of marketization. These approaches to measure 
marketization per se, however, are far from ideal and consequently subject to criticisms (see 
Walder 1996). 
Given the mixed economies in contemporary China, it seems logical to compare 
differences across sectors. Based on a sector’s closeness to the market, the differences in 
                                                 
1 According to Szelenyi (1978, 1983), since market and redistribution are two qualitatively 
different mechanisms that generate inequalities, inequalities under one system (redistribution) 
can be reduced by introducing the alternative (market) as a counterbalancing mechanism. As 
market arises to a dominant mechanism, inequality then increases. Both the early decline and the 
later increase in income inequality are due to the emerging market economy. Peasants and 
ordinary workers (direct producers) can be better off in the early reform era than in the pre-
reform era by participating in market activities and gaining subsidies, and thereby reducing their 
income disadvantages in the redistributive hierarchy.  
2 A recent study by Hauser and Xie (2001) shows, despite overall increases in earnings returns to 
schooling from 1988 to 1995, that the increases are negatively associated with the pace of 
economic growth at the city level.     
      William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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earnings determinants may be interpreted as the consequence of marketization. The institutional 
distinction is commonly drawn between the state and market sectors. Higher returns to human 
capital (e.g., education) in the market sector than in the state sector are conceived as evidence 
consistent with market transition theory (Cao and Nee 2000; Knight and Song 1993; Tang and 
Parish 1999; Wu 2002a). Using a continuum of workplaces (danwei) categorized by their degree 
of marketization (i.e., government agencies, public organizations, central government firms, 
local government firms, collective firms, and hybrid/private firms) is seen as another way to 
measure the extent to which marketization has affected workers’ earnings (Zhou 2000a).  
While these sector/workplace measures are relatively easy to collect and theoretically 
appealing, this approach has overlooked the fact that labor markets, if assumed to be in 
operation, are somewhat fluid at the local level (Hauser and Xie 2001). That is to say, the sorting 
of workers into different sectors/workplaces is unlikely to be exogenous, especially from the 
state sector to the market sector. Whereas Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union adopted a 
strategy of transforming their redistributive economies through a radical privatization policy, 
China has chosen an incremental path to expand it’s new non-state economy, resulting in gradual 
shrinkage of the state sector (Lin, Cai, and Li 1994; Pei 1996; Qian 1999). In this light, the 
primary thrust in the economic transition came from the growth of new private and semi-private 
sectors that gradually caught up with and overtook the state sector. Consequently, in a mixed 
economy such as China’s, the transition of workers from the state to the market sectors is an 
integral part of the multi-faceted process of market transition. The labor market sorting process 
per se could exert a great impact on the labor market outcomes such as earnings.  
Participants in the market transition debate (see AJS symposium 1996 vol. 101) have so 
far paid inadequate attention to labor markets -- the central institution directly responsible for William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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generating income inequalities. While researchers have chosen to analyze income/earnings as a 
key outcome measure, the labor market as the concrete institutional context remains elusive.
 In 
examining changing patterns of income distribution, we must explicitly account for the changing 
scope of labor markets conditions, which reflects an important aspect of the institutional 
transition from redistribution to markets. 
Moreover, in addressing the central question of who wins and who loses in the market 
transition debate, the conception of social actors remains largely static. Scholars are too focused 
on which groups have gained advantages at the expense of other groups, not realizing that 
individuals’ membership in such groups could easily change over time. Thus, before answering 
the question of who has gained and lost, we need to understand how various social actors have 
responded to the pressures of the economic reform.  
As Szelenyi and Kostello (1996) point out, whether the cadres or former cadres are 
winners in post-socialist Poland and Hungary is a complex issue, depending on the ways they 
associated themselves with market opportunities. A fraction of the old nomenklatura who 
entered the market has become the new corporate bourgeoisie, while most old communist elite 
members are losers on the sideline. In the late 1980s, returns to education in urban China were 
seriously distorted by the segmented labor markets under different reward systems. An egg-cake 
vendor’s daily earnings could surpass a university professor’s monthly salary, mainly because 
the reward system for the latter was rigid and limited in the redistributive economy (Li and Hong 
1993; Zhao 1993; Zhou and Tan 1996). Within the state sector, returns to education are lower for 
bonuses set by work units than for base salaries set by the government (Walder 1990; Wu 
2002a). Over time, the economic reform in urban China afforded opportunities for workers to 
move out of the state sector. Thus, the winners or losers of the market transition are not defined William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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until we take into account concrete institutional settings within which they move across sectoral 
boundaries in the labor market. It is in this sense that we say that workers are dynamic social 
actors who are not simply affected by the market, but rather respond to it by actively situating 
themselves in the labor market.     
Indeed, this perspective of dynamic social actors can help us understand some empirical 
results reported in the literature on market transition. Various surveys conducted in the 
mid-1980s China have shown that most private entrepreneurs and self-employees (getihu) were 
migrant peasants, unemployed youth, people dismissed by work units, criminals released from 
prisons, and retirees (Li 1993: 323-30). This finding supports Szelenyi and Kostello’s argument 
(1996) that in early stages of economic reform the early entrants to the market sector tended to 
be those in the low tiers of social hierarchy who were not at risk of losing the privileges enjoyed 
by workers in the state sector.   
However, as marketization proceeded and risks in the market were further reduced, 
workers with marketable skills began gradually switching to the market sector to grasp new 
opportunities there. Communist cadres also learned to embrace the market and cash in their 
political and social capitals. With the competition from these groups, the early market pioneers 
were marginalized or in certain situations even wiped out. In China, waves of professionals and 
government officials have entered the market -- or “jumped into the sea” (xiahai) -- since 1992 
(Chen 1993).
3 Meanwhile, workers in state-owned enterprises who were part of the mass layoffs 
(xiagang) occasioned by further economic reform in the 1990s were pushed into the market 
sector for their livelihoods (Ketizu 1997; Lee C. 1999; Lee H. 2000).  
                                                 
3According an estimate by the China Ministry of Personnel, in a single year of 1992 more than 
120,000 cadres resigned from their posts in the government and joined in the market activities 
(Chen 1993).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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As a result, the workers entering the market sector in the later stages of the economic 
reform are likely to include both those who were “pushed” and those who “jumped” (Hauser and 
Xie 2001). While the laid-off workers from state enterprises are likely to have lower human 
capital and political capital, cadre and professionals who chose to give up their “iron rice bowls” 
voluntarily tended to have better education and/or possess the political capital needed to gain 
new advantages in the market. Pooling these two very different groups together creates a 
heterogeneous body of later market entrants who, as a group, appear to have high returns to 
education. 
Hence, we question the prevailing wisdom that marketization per se causes high returns 
to human capital among workers in the market sector. Instead, we propose that the explanation 
may lie in sorting processes of workers into the market sector. In our view, many of the 
controversies in the current literature are rooted in inattention to individual workers’ dynamic 
experience of mobility across sectors in China’s mixed economy. The main purpose of this paper 
is to link macro-level socioeconomic transitions and changes in workers’ economic positions by 
introducing individual workers’ labor market histories as an intermediate process.    
 
Workers’ Transition in Labor Markets: Typology and Hypotheses 
The foregoing discussion calls for a better understanding of social actors with different 
experiences in the labor markets in reform-era China. Toward this goal, we propose a typology 
of workers based on their work histories. First, we categorize all workers in the urban labor force 
into two groups: those in the state sector and those in the market sector. Although job mobility 
may often occur within each sector, mobility across the sectors is less frequent but has a far more 
significant implication for the changing relative strength of the redistributive and market William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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economies in the post-socialist transition (Wu 2002b; Zhou, Tuma and Moen 1997). Because it 
is particularly difficult to move from the market to the state sector, labor mobility is generally a 
one-way transition from the state to the market.   
Characterizing workers based on their mobility histories in labor markets requires 
knowledge of their current and previous work sectors. Combining information pertaining to a 
worker’s sector status at two points in time, we obtain a two-by-two table that specifies four 
types of workers. 
In Table 1, the first type, which describes a majority of Chinese workers, are those who 
were in the state sector initially and have continued to stay there. We name them “stayers.” The 
second type (“later entrants”) describes those who began in the state sector but later transferred 
to the market sector. As previously mentioned, this group consists of two subcategories: those 
who elected to enter the market sector and those who were forced to leave the state sector. The 
third type (“market losers”) includes those who initially were in the market sector but later 
retreated to the state sector. Given the rigid institutional boundary between the two sectors, very 
few workers have re-entered the state sector. The last type (“early birds”) consists of those who 
entered the market early and have stayed there.  
Using this classification of workers, we draw implications in earnings inequality and 
returns to education among them. We begin with a well-accepted hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Returns to education in earnings are higher in the market sector than in the 
state sector.  
If the above hypothesis were confirmed, there could be two possible explanations, from 
which we would further derive two hypotheses. First, higher returns to human capital in the 
market sector can be interpreted as caused by market mechanisms per se, as the market and state William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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sectors may allocate and reward human resources in different ways (Bian and Logan 1996; Nee 
and Cao 1995; Zhao and Zhou 2001). As shown in Table 1, we can further separate market 
sector workers into “early birds” and “later entrants.”  Because all workers in the market sector 
are subject to the same market mechanisms, both of these groups should have similar and 
relatively higher earnings returns to education than those in the state sector. Hence, we can test 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Returns to education are higher for both later entrants and early birds than 
for stayers.
4      
Alternatively, as posited by Szelenyi and Kostello (1996), while early birds with little 
human and political capital may have benefited from the economic reform and marketization in 
the initial stage, they may have lost their advantages after more qualified people started 
transferring to the market sector (xiahai). The resulting stiffer market competition may have 
pushed the early birds to marginal positions in the sector, affording them neither a higher level of 
earnings nor higher returns to education than the stayers. This argument is central to our thesis 
here: that higher returns to education for all workers in the market sector are due to higher 
returns for later entrants only. That is, we focus on the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2b: Returns to education are higher in the market sector only for later 
entrants. Returns for early birds are not significantly higher than for stayers.   
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are two competing explanations as to why returns to education are 
higher in the market sector than in the state sector. Figure 1 provides an intuitive illustration of 
the second explanation. If Hypothesis 2a is rejected and Hypothesis 2b is confirmed, then the 
                                                 
4. Workers in the state sector can be decomposed into “stayers” and “market losers”. Since 
“market losers” account for only 2 percent of the sample (42 cases), in the following we will use 
“stayers” in the state sector as the benchmark for comparison. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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state-market disparity in returns to education can hardly be attributed to market mechanisms per 
se. Instead, the selectivity and heterogeneity of later markets entrants may help explain the 
group’s distinct performance.  
As described before, later entrants consist of two types of workers, those who were 
“pushed” out or laid off from the state sector (i.e., “involuntary entrants”), and those who 
voluntarily “jumped” into the market sector (i.e., “voluntary entrants”) to grasp new 
opportunities. Combining these two groups would likely yield a high rate of returns to education 
in the market sector, but would the returns differ significantly between the two groups?  To test 
the heterogeneity and selectivity of later entrants, we pose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Involuntary later entrants and voluntary later entrants are distinct from 
each other and subject to different mechanisms of selection. Involuntary entrants tend to possess 
unobservable characteristics negatively associated with potential earnings, while voluntary 
entrants tend to possess unobservable characteristics positively associated with potential 
earnings. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, involuntary entrants, who have been forced to leave the state 
sector, tend to be concentrated in low-skilled jobs with low pay in the market sector (the lower- 
left zone of the graph), and tend to be less educated and negatively selective because they 
possess unmeasured traits undesired by the market. On the other hand, voluntary entrants tend to 
be highly educated and positively selective in the sense that their unmeasured traits are 
associated with high earnings in the market (the upper-right zone of the graph). Combining these 
two subgroups would yield higher returns to education (a steeper slope in Figure 2) for “later 
entrants” as a single group.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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Data and Variables 
1. Data  
Our empirical analyses are based on the survey of “Life Histories and Social Change in 
Contemporary China” (1996), a multi-stage stratified national probability sample of 6,090 adults 
aged 20-69 from all regions of China (except Tibet). The survey gathered extensive information 
on respondents’ life histories and job activities. Because life in rural and urban China is very 
different, samples from rural and urban areas were drawn separately, yielding 3,003 rural cases 
and 3,087 urban cases (Treiman 1998: Appendix D).  We use the urban half of the sample 
because few rural residents worked in the state sector, and market transitions in rural and urban 
China are fundamentally different (Peng 1992; Wu 2002b). After eliminating from this group 
those not active in the labor force, we had 2,076 respondents for the analysis.  
In this paper, we investigate the process of labor market transitions in the period between 
1987 and 1996. We selected 1987 as the benchmark year because the urban economic reform 
was initiated in 1986. Prior to 1986, private economy and labor markets were almost 
nonexistent, and few workers had transferred from the state to the market sectors. Therefore, in 
Table 1, 1987 is used for the year of the worker’s initial sector and 1996 for the year of the 
worker’s current sector.  
2. Variables  
Distinguishing the market sector from the state sector is crucial to the typology of workers 
proposed in Table 1. Three criteria can be employed: respondent’s affiliated work organization, 
respondent’s occupation, and respondent’s main source of incomes. As concerns the first 
criterion, newly emerging types of work organizations such as “corporate enterprises,” 
“domestic private enterprise,” “joint ventures,” and “foreign invested firms” are coded as market William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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sector organizations, whereas “government agencies,” “state institutions,” “state-enterprises,” 
and “collective enterprises” are coded as state sector organizations. Urban collective enterprises, 
although marginal to the redistributive core, are not the outcome of the market reform because 
they existed long prior to the reform. To a large extent, the urban collective enterprises 
resembled state enterprises in operating mechanisms and management styles.  
Second, the state versus market sectors can also be defined according to occupation. We 
code occupations of “self-employment” (getihu) and “private enterprise owner” (siying qiye zhu) 
as market occupations. Changing from a state job to one of these two categories is considered 
entry into the market sector. This definition may overlap with that based on work organization.  
Since a worker may participate in economic activities in the market without necessarily 
changing occupations or work organizations, we employ a third criterion to broaden the 
definition of the market sector. If a respondent’s main source of income is from “running a 
business,” or an “independent occupation,” or “helping others’ business,” then they are coded as 
working in the market sector, even if their occupation and work organization are in the state 
sector.  
Figure 3 presents the percentages of workers in the market sector, as defined by each of 
these three criteria, during the period covered by the survey data (1949 to 1996). The definitions 
of the market sector based on occupation and work organization yield similar percentages. The 
definition based the main source of incomes is broader, yielding higher percentages of workers 
in the market sector. Results from all three definitions are consistent with the historical trend we 
observed from China’s national statistics: after 1956, when the socialist transformation of private 
industry and trade was completed, the market sector was essentially eradicated until the market-
oriented economic reform started in the late 1970s. Consistent with the pace of market transition, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
 
 
15
 
the percentages of workers in the market sector, by all the three definitions, have increased 
substantially since the mid-1980s. In this study, we take a conservative approach – coding 
workers in the market sector if they meet any of the three criteria – which gives us an adequate 
number of cases in our market sector data.   
Our dependent variable is the monthly total of earned income, regardless of whether it is 
from regular wages or earnings from market businesses. For most respondents, we use monthly 
income from a job (averaged over the preceding year). For non-wage earners (mostly in the 
market sector), we impute monthly earnings by dividing the net income from their family 
business in 1995 by the number of working family members, and by 12 months. We take the 
logarithm of the monthly earnings as our dependent variable in multivariate analyses.     
Our empirical analyses contain two parts: in the first part, we examine the difference in 
returns to education among four types of workers based on a modified human capital model. The 
independent variables include education, work experience, party membership, and gender. 
Education, a continuous variable, is measured in terms of years of schooling completed. Work 
experience is approximated by the difference between the year of 1996 and the year when the 
respondent first entered the labor force. Because many previous studies have shown that the 
relationship between experience and earnings is curvilinear, we add a square term of work 
experience in regression equations. Party membership, which denotes political capital in China, 
is coded as a dummy variable (yes = 1), as is gender (male = 1).  
In the second part, we distinguish between voluntary and involuntary later entrants, and 
examine how the selection processes differ for the two subgroups. In addition to the independent 
variables mentioned above, we include three more variables that may predict market entry: the 
father’s work sector, the respondent’s marital status, and region of residence. Because William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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entrepreneurialism may be transferred across generations (Szelenyi 1988), we include a dummy 
variable indicating whether a respondent’s father was in the market sector when the respondent 
was age 14 (yes = 1). Marital status, an important life course variable, is also coded as a dummy 
(currently married or remarried = 1).   
Finally, because large regional variations in economic structure and the pace of 
marketization create varying opportunities for entering the market sector, we control for region 
of residence. The sample was drawn in 50 cities/ counties clustered in 24 heterogeneous 
provinces/provincial-level jurisdictions.
5  We map the respondents into six relatively 
homogeneous regions and denote them by a set of dummy variables. In the southern province of 
 “Guangdong” marketization is far ahead of that in the rest of China. Three “central 
municipalities” (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) are metropolitan cities directly under the central 
government’s jurisdiction. “Coastal provinces” include Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong, where the 
marketization also started earlier. Three “northeastern provinces” (Liaoning, Jilin, and 
Heilongjiang) share many similarities in economic structures as China’s major base of heavy 
industry. “middle provinces” include Hebei, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan; and 
“western provinces” include Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, Shannxi, and Guangxi. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the following 
analyses, by work sector in 1996 and by four types of workers. Of 2,079 workers in the urban 
labor force, 1,558 were in the state sector and 521 were in the market sector in 1996. For 
workers in the state sector, the majority started their first jobs in the state sector and had stayed 
there, while only 42 had transferred from the market sector. As expected, mobility from the 
                                                 
5 They include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Neimenggu, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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market sector to the state sector is rare. Among those workers in the market sector, 294 started 
their jobs in the state sector but later transferred to the market sector, and 227 workers entered 
early and had stayed there.    
 
Difference in Returns to Education 
1. Models  
We employ a modified human capital model based on the classic human capital model of Mincer 
(1974), with the addition of gender, and an indicator of political capital measured by party 
membership (Walder 1990; Xie and Hannum 1996). The model is specified as:  
log(Y) =β0+β1EDUC+β2EXP+β3EXP
2+β4PARTY+β5SEX+ε ,                                     (1)  
where ε represents the residual unexplained by the baseline model and β parameters are 
regression coefficients measuring returns to respective independent variables.  
To measure earnings differences by sector and to allow returns to education to vary by 
sector, a model with an interaction term between education and sector in 1996 can be fitted as:  
log(Y)=β0+β1EDUC+β2EXP+β3EXP
2+β4PARTY+β5SEX+β6SECTOR+β7SECTOR*EDUC+ε      (2) 
where SECTOR is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is in the market sector 
(yes=1); β6 is earnings difference by sector when education is equal to zero; and  β7 denotes the 
difference in returns to education between the market and state sectors.  
To classify workers into four groups and compare returns to education among them, a 
similar model with interaction terms between education and worker type is specified as: 
log(Y)=β0+β1EDUC+β2EXP+β3 EXP
2+β4PARTY+β5SEX+ β6jTYPE j + β7j TYPEj *EDUC+ε   (3) 
 where j= 2, 3, 4; TYPEj is a set of dummies referring to later entrants (j=2), market losers (j=3), and early 
birds (j=4), with stayers as the reference; β6j denotes the difference in earnings by worker type when William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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education equals zero; and β7j denotes the difference in returns to education by worker type.  
Because the survey research design (see details in Treiman 1998) necessitated clustering 
the sample within 50 city districts/counties, an adjustment on standard errors is needed in 
regression analyses. All the models reported were estimated using Stata 7.0, with robust standard 
errors to correct the clustering on sampling units (districts/counties) (Stata Corp. 2001). The data 
were appropriately weighted to represent the Chinese general population.  
2. Results   
Table 3 reports the estimates for models of earnings determination. Model 1 is a baseline model, 
in which education; work experience and its square term; party membership; and gender are 
included as predictors (Eq. 1). All variables have significant effects on earnings. The rate of 
returns to education is about 5 percent (=e
0.048), slightly higher than other estimates (Byron and 
Manaloto 1990; Walder 1990; Xie and Hannum 1996; Hauser and Xie 2001). Party members 
enjoy a 11 percent (=e
0.099-1) advantage. As expected, the effect of work experience on earnings 
is concave, first increasing with experience early in the life course, and then diminishing after 
reaching the optimal number of years (about 30) of work experience. Gender difference in 
earnings are also estimated to be large, with men earning 27 percent (=e
0.240-1) more than 
women, other things being equal. 
In Model 2 and Model 3 of Table 3, we compare the earnings regimes between the state 
sector and the market sector. Model 2 is an additive model with sector included as a dummy 
variable. It is shown that workers in the market sector earn 28 percent (=e
0.246-1) more than their 
counterparts in the state sector. To further examine differential returns to education between the 
two sectors, we fit a model with an interaction term between sector and education (Eq. 2). The 
positive coefficient for the interaction term (β7) is statistically significant (p<. 01), suggesting William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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that returns to education are higher in the market sector than in the state sector. One additional 
year of schooling increases earnings by 9.7 percent for workers in the market sector, but only 4.9 
percent for workers in the state sector, holding constant the other factors. This finding lends 
support to Hypothesis 1 and confirms what have been found in early studies (Bian and Logan 
1996; Zhao and Zhou 2001; Zhou 2000a; Cao and Nee 2000).      
However, it would be premature to conclude from the above results that a market 
economy utilizes human resources better and thereby yields higher rewards to education than a 
redistributive economy. Such a high rate of returns could be largely attributed to the sorting 
process of workers in labor markets, rather than market mechanisms per se. Therefore, we 
decompose workers into four types based on their labor market histories, as specified in Table 1. 
In Model 4 of Table 3, we fit an additive model, which only allows the intercepts to vary by 
worker type. Results show that, among workers in the market sector in 1996, only later entrants 
enjoyed significantly higher earnings than those who stayed in the state sector – 24 percent 
higher on average, other things being equal. If the market per se pays off, the early birds should 
have more advantages since they had accumulated more human capital (i.e., experience) specific 
to the market sector. Nevertheless, we find that the early birds seem to have no advantage in 
earnings compared to workers who have stayed in the state sector. Our results seem to support 
the speculation by Szelenyi and Kostello (1996) that early market entrants tend to be pushed to 
marginal positions as more qualified people enter the market sector, depriving them of any 
potential earnings advantage.   
Furthermore, in Model 5 of Table 3, we specifically examine how returns to education 
differ among the four types of workers. We allow education to interact with worker type (Eq. 3). 
The coefficient of the interaction term β7j indicates the difference in returns to education between William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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each of the other type of workers (j) (later entrants, market losers, and early birds) and the 
reference group (stayers). In Model 5, we found no differences in returns to education between 
market losers and stayers nor between early birds and stayers.  It is worth noting that early birds 
seem to have been overtaken by later market entrants by 1996 in terms of both earnings and 
earnings returns to education. This evidence is contrary to Hypothesis 2a and supports its 
alternative Hypothesis 2b.  
As shown here, the commonly observed differentials in both earnings and returns to 
education between the state sector and the market sector are due entirely to the outstanding 
performance of later entrants. Model 5 indicates that later entrants, in addition to having 
significantly higher earnings than stayers, also enjoy higher returns to education. Other things 
being equal, an additional year of schooling increases earnings of later entrants by 9.5 percent 
(=e
0.047+0.044-1), compared to a rate of increase at 4.8 per cent (=e
0.047-1) for workers staying in 
the state sector. Our early result of a sharp contrast between the market sector and the state 
sector from Model 3 (9.7 percent versus 4.9 percent) is almost replicated here. In terms of 
earnings, education is more valuable for later entrants, not simply because they work in the 
market sector (otherwise, early birds should have had the same advantages), but because they 
transferred from the state sector. This suggests that the selective process of the transition could 
have engendered the observed results.  
To summarize, we have found that past labor market experiences distinguish workers 
within the market sector, with the earnings advantage of the market sector being limited to later 
entrants. Early birds, despite of their longer exposure to market competition, have no advantages 
in either earnings or earnings returns to education over those who remained in the state sector. 
Thus, it appears that it is not the market per se that renders higher rewards to later market William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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entrants.   
An intriguing question is why education is rewarded more highly for later entrants to the 
market sector. As we argued before, the heterogeneity among later entrants could be a critical 
factor. In the remainder of this paper, we distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
transitions among later entrants and examine the different mechanisms in selecting workers into 
these two subgroups. 
 
Involuntary and Voluntary Entrants: Different Selection Mechanisms    
1. Involuntary Entrants and Voluntary Entrants   
As marketization deepens and the market sector expands in urban China, two simultaneous 
trends emerged in regard to workers’ entry into the market sector, especially after 1992. On the 
one hand, a growing number of qualified workers voluntarily gave up career opportunities in the 
state sector to enter the market sector. On the other hand, a growing number of workers in state 
enterprises that were performing poorly were laid off and forced to enter the market sector (Lee 
C. 1999; Lee H. 2000). Later entrants consist of both these voluntary and involuntary entrants.  
Our empirical data do not contain a direct measurement of respondents’ motivations for 
making labor market transitions. Thus we have no explicit information on whether a 
respondent’s market entry is voluntary or involuntary. However, assuming workers are rational 
actors who can weigh gains and losses in deciding whether or not to make a transition, the 
distinction can be made by comparing the observed labor market outcome (actual earnings in 
1996) of later market entrants to their counterfactual earnings had they stayed in the state sector 
until 1996.  We operationalize “involuntary entrants” as those who were economically not 
significantly better off in the market sector than they would have been in the state sector, and  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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“voluntary entrants” as those who are much better off than they would have been in the state 
sector.  
To estimate later entrants’ counterfactual earnings in the state sector, we first regress 
logged earnings on education, years of schooling, experience and its square term, and party 
membership for workers actually in the state sector in 1996.  We then predict later entrants’ 
counterfactual earnings using the estimated equation with their observed characteristics, which 
projects expected earnings for later entrants had they stayed in the state sector (we know that 
they were no longer in the state sector in 1996).  
By comparing the counterfactual earnings with actual earnings, we create a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not these workers made a voluntary transition. Because workers in 
the state sector enjoy some non-monetary benefits unavailable to workers in the market sector, 
we assume that workers would voluntarily transfer to the market sector only if their market 
earnings (excluding cash compensation for the loss of welfare benefits) were much higher than 
their earnings in the state sector.
 Thus, we define “voluntary entrants” as those whose actual 
earnings in the market sector are at least 80 percent higher than their counterfactual earnings in 
the state sector.
 6 That is: 
(Ym-Ys)/ Ys >0.8 
                                                   or  Ym/ Ys >1.8 ,                                                         (4) 
where Ym, refers to a respondent’s actual earrings in 1996, and Ys refers the respondent’s 
                                                 
6  The non-monetary benefits that were provided by the state sector accounted for at least 50 per 
cent of the total wage bills (Ketizu 1997; Lee C. 1999:47). This suggests that one has to earn at 
least 50 per cent more in market wages to compensate for the loss of non-monetary benefits. We 
put an additional rate of 30 per cent as the incentive for people to voluntarily transfer to the 
market sector. This rate is about the same as the wage gap between state and market employees 
(SSB 1997). Therefore, voluntary market entrants essentially refer to those who earn market 
wages without losing state non-monetary benefits (or being compensated in cash).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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counterfactual earnings in the state sector. Rearranging the inequality and taking the logarithm 
on both sides, we obtain the following:  
                                               ln(Ym)>ln(Ys)+ln(1.8)                                               (5)       
Based on the above inequality, we distinguish two subgroups of later entrants from our 
total of 294: 102 voluntary entrants who earned at least 80 percent higher than what they would 
have in the state sector and 192 involuntary entrants who did not. Figure 4 is the scatter-plot 
between the logged earnings and years of education for later entrants. As clearly shown in the 
graph and consistent with the scenario portrayed in Figure 2, voluntary entrants are 
disproportionately concentrated in the upper right zone with both high education and high 
earnings, whereas involuntary entrants are disproportionately concentrated in the zone with both 
low education and low earnings. The average years of schooling are 8.63 years for voluntary 
entrants and 7.63 years for involuntary entrants (weighted). A t-test shows that the difference is 
statistically significant (p<. 001).  
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
After the disaggregation of later entrants, we then examine the difference in returns to 
education among the five groups of workers, as shown in Table 4.  We first fit an additive model 
(Model 1) and then allow returns to education to vary across stayers, involuntary later entrants, 
voluntary later entrants, market losers, and early birds (Model 2). Model 1 shows that, in 
comparison to stayers, neither market losers nor early birds enjoy earnings advantages, and 
although voluntary later entrants earn more than three times (=e
1.150) as much as stayers, 
involuntary later entrants earn only about 80 percent (=e
-0.237) as much, other things being equal. 
Model 2 of Table 4 reveals no significant difference in returns to education between involuntary 
later entrants and stayers, while voluntary later entrants enjoy a slight advantage over stayers in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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regard to returns to education (p<. 05). One additional year of schooling increases earnings by 8 
percent for voluntary entrants but only by 5 percent for stayers. A Wald test indicates no 
statistical difference in returns to education between involuntary and voluntary later entrants.  
2. Different Selection Mechanisms for Involuntary and Voluntary Entrants 
To further investigate heterogeneity among later entrants, we examine and compare the 
processes of selection into involuntary and voluntary later market entrants. As conceptualized 
before, involuntary entrants were forced to leave the state sector (due to layoffs), whereas 
voluntary entrants were self-starters attracted by high rewards in the market sector. The two 
groups could be significantly different in observable and unobservable characteristics from each 
other and from workers who stayed in the state sector.  
To account for unobserved heterogeneity that may underlie both market entry and 
earnings potential, we employ Heckman two-stage selection models. We first deal with the 
selection into involuntary later entrants from those who were initially in the state sector. In the 
first stage, a standard probit model for the process of selection into involuntary entrants is 
formulated as follows: 
                                    Z*=γ’X1+u                                                               (6) 
where Z* is the latent variable for z=1 (involuntary entrants) if Z*>0, and z=0 if Z* ≤ 0. Z* is 
specified as a linear function of a set of explanatory variables plus a residual term u, which is 
assumed to follow a standard normal distribution (u~ N [0, 1]).          
In the second stage, we apply the modified human capital model (Eq. 1) to involuntary 
later market entrants: 
                   ln (Y) =β’X2 +ε      observed only if z=1 .                                                  (7) 
Eq. (7) is restricted to involuntary entrants. This equation may not be estimated via OLS William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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regression since  
               E[ε | Y is observed]=E[ε|z=1]= E[ε|Z*>0]=E[ε| u>- γ’X]= 0 
holds true only when the correlation (ρ) between the residual terms ε  and u is equal to zero. OLS 
estimates will be biased if the two residual terms in two equations are correlated.  
   Allowing for a potential correlation between the two residual terms (i.e., ρ is not equal to 
zero), Eq. (7) is estimated by adding to OLS regression an additional predictor λ, calculated 
using the fitted values of Z* from the estimation of Eq. (7).  The estimated coefficient for this 
term will be equal to ρΦ , where ρ is the correlation between two residual terms u and ε, and Φ  is 
the standard deviation of ε (Greene 2000; Heckman 1979; Raymo and Xie 2000; Willis and 
Rosen 1979; Winship and Mare 1992). Since Φ  is always positive, a negative correlation (ρ<0) 
between the two residual terms means a negatively selectivity: those workers who entered the 
market sector involuntarily have lower potential earnings than those who actually stayed in the 
state sector. In contrast, a positive correlation (ρ>0) would suggest a positive selectivity. 
    In estimating the probit model of selection into involuntary later entrants, we include the 
father’s work sector when the respondent was age 14 and the respondent’s marital status and 
region as predictors, in addition to the variables in the earnings equation. For the earnings 
equation, we use the baseline modified human capital model (Eq. 1). Analogously, we estimate 
Heckman two-stage models for voluntary market entrants.      
Table 5 presents two-stage coefficient estimates for both involuntary later market 
entrants (Model 1 and Model 2) and voluntary later market entrants (Model 3 and Model 4).  In 
Model 1, both education and party membership strongly protect workers from being laid off and 
pushed into the market sector. Other things being equal, one year of schooling decreases the 
probit coefficient of education by 0.114, and being a party member decreases the probit William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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coefficient by 0.083 (p<. 001). Model 3 also shows a negative association between education and 
the likelihood of voluntary market entry: one additional year of schooling decreases the probit 
coefficient of education by 0.096, net of other factors. Party members are less likely than non-
party members to voluntarily transfer to the market sector, but the difference is insignificant at 
the conventional level (p= 0.053). This suggests that, compared to those who continue to stay in 
the state sector, involuntary market entrants and voluntary market entrants differ in some 
observable characteristics. It seems that workers with greater human and political capital are less 
likely to be pushed from the state to the market sector, but may instead jump to the market sector 
when they are able to take advantage of more attractive rewards and newly available 
opportunities.    
As to regional effects, only workers in Guangdong have significantly higher probabilities 
of transition to the market sector, both involuntarily and voluntarily, than their counterparts in 
Western provinces. There is no noticeable difference in market entry across other regions. This 
suggests Guangdong’s advanced pace of economic reform and marketization, which have acted 
to both increased layoffs in state-owned enterprises and attract workers to jobs in the market 
sector.      
The significant coefficients for λ indicate that the OLS estimates for the earnings 
equations are biased for both involuntary and involuntary later entrants. The estimated value of ρ 
(-0.59) for involuntary later entrants indicates a strong negative selectivity (i.e., higher earnings 
potential is associated with a lower likelihood of involuntary market entry). In contrast, the 
estimated value of ρ (0.46) for voluntary later entrants indicates a strong positive selectivity (i.e., 
voluntary later entrants have earned more than if they were randomly transferred from the state 
to the market sector). Net of the selectivity, Model 2 and Model 4 of Table 5 present the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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unbiased estimates of OLS parameters in earnings equations respectively for both involuntary 
and voluntary later market entrants. For the former, the rate of net returns to education increases 
from 4.4 percent (=e
0.043 -1) to 7.3 percent (=e
0.070-1) after the correction (p<. 001). For the latter, 
the rate of net returns to education decreases from to 9.5 percent (=e
0.091-1) to 6.6 percent (e
0.064-
1) after the adjustment, and the effect is still statistically significant (p<. 01). A t-test for the 
difference in the education coefficient between involuntary and voluntary later market entrants is 
insignificant.  
Although party membership strongly protects workers from being pushed into the market 
sector, the advantage of party membership is huge among workers who do involuntarily enter the 
market sector: party members earn 96 percent (=e
0.672) more than non-party members, other 
things being equal. However, party membership has no significant effect on earnings for 
voluntary market entrants. Again, this suggests that the market mechanism per se does not 
decrease or increase the role of party membership in earnings determinations. We speculate that 
for involuntary entrants, who tend to be concentrated in the fields of self-employment and small 
businesses, social connections (guanxi) associated with party membership may play a more 
important role in earnings. Thus the effect of political advantage on economic advantage in the 
market sector depends on the route of entering the market.  
Although a systematic sensitivity analysis is not conducted, we have explored a few other 
models with threshold rates ranging from 50 percent to 100 percent. Figure 5 plots the results on 
returns to education and significance levels of selectivity for both involuntary and voluntary later 
entrants at selected rates (see Eq. 4). Returns to education are invariant with the change of rate. 
Especially when the rate is over 70 percent, the difference in the estimated coefficients for 
education between involuntary and voluntary market entrants is almost negligible. As to the level William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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of selectivity biases, when the rate is set close to 50 percent, we see a significant selection into 
the group of involuntary entrants (p<. 05) but an insignificant selection into the group of 
voluntary entrants. If the threshold is set low, some involuntary entrants who did slightly better 
in the market may have been included in the group of voluntary entrants, thus the positive 
selection into the group of voluntary entrants may become less obvious.  
In summary, the results in Table 5 suggest different mechanisms of selection for 
voluntary and involuntary later market entrants, lending support in favor of Hypothesis 3. 
Workers with unmeasured characteristics associated with low earnings potential are more likely 
to be laid off and enter the market sector involuntarily. In other words, involuntary entrants 
actually do worse than would have been the case without the selectivity. On the other hand, 
workers with unmeasured characteristics associated with high earnings potential are more likely 
to voluntarily enter the market sector, so they actually do better than would have been the case 
without the selectivity. After selection biases are corrected, differentials in returns to education 
among voluntary entrants, involuntary entrants, and stayers, cease to exist.           
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
Previous literatures on the market transition debate have missed the direct link between 
individuals’ labor market histories and individuals’ labor market outcomes. In this paper, we 
developed a typology of workers based on their job histories. We proposed a model of selective 
transition of workers from the state sector to the market sector, and derived 4 hypotheses in 
regard to earnings inequality and earnings returns to education. Although our results confirm the 
prevailing wisdom that returns to education are higher in the market sector than in the state 
sector, no differences, in either earnings or returns to education, have been found between early William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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birds in the market sector and stayers in the state sector. Instead, the observed differences are 
limited to later market entrants. These findings run counter to the claim that market mechanisms 
per se lead to high returns to human capital and indicate the need a better understanding of the 
dynamic processes of social actors during market transition. Workers entering the market sector 
in the initial stage of the urban economic reform no longer enjoyed advantages in either earnings 
or returns to education in 1996. The major winners in the market transition are later market 
entrants (Szelenyi and Kostello 1996; Wu 2002b).  
Further analysis provides an alternative explanation for the higher returns to education 
for later market entrants. After disaggregating the two types of later entrants -- those who were 
“pushed” and those who “jumped” into the market sector -- and correcting selection biases, we 
find no significant difference in returns to education among voluntary entrants, involuntary 
entrants, and workers staying in the state sector. We conclude that higher returns to education in 
the market sector of a transition economy cannot be construed as caused by marketization per se. 
The sorting process of workers in labor markets helps explain the results.  
Our findings suggest that researchers should reconsider the implications drawn from 
sectoral comparisons in addressing the social consequences of market transition in post-socialist 
countries (e.g., Cao and Nee 2000; Tang and Parish 1999; Zhao and Zhou 2001; Zhou 2000a, 
2000b). While the argument that the institutional structure of an economy is important in 
determining social stratification outcomes is undisputed, sectoral distinctions do not necessarily 
lead to the difference in economic returns to education. Vice versa, without critically examining 
the labor market conditions, imputing the institutional significance from the sectoral differences 
in returns to education is unwarranted. Furthermore, researchers should also be cautious when 
interpreting the temporal trend of returns to education in the reform era. The increase in the role William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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of education as an earnings determinant could result from the changing sectoral composition of 
the economy and workers’ increasing mobility into the market sector over time, rather than 
marketization per se.  
The evidence that the state and market institutions do not differ in rewarding human 
capital (education) may be striking, but not surprising. Comparative studies have shown that 
education assumes a universally important role in social stratification and mobility in all modern 
societies, regardless of socialist or capitalist (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). From a perspective of 
economic and labor market segmentation, market economies are commonly divided into two 
sectors -- core and peripheral sectors, or primary and secondary labor markets -- which are 
believed to be fundamentally different  (Althauser and Kalleberg 1981; Beck, Horan and Tolbert 
1978; Cain 1976; Hodson and Kaufman 1982). Yet several empirical studies have found no 
sectoral difference in income/wages determination in the United States, particularly in terms of 
human capital variables (e.g., Sakamoto and Chen 1991; Zucker and Rosenstein 1981). Why do 
the global institutional differences have little impact on the sectoral difference in earnings 
returns to education? Dual labor market theorists have extensively examined how the concrete 
institutional factors such as unionization, establishment size, and occupational structures within 
each sector ameliorate the effect of education on wages (see summary in Sakomoto and Chen 
1991). We believe that scholars studying stratification outcomes in post-socialist societies should 
move in a similar direction by examining concrete institutional parameters within the state sector 
or the market sector, rather than presuming the overarching dichotomy. Understanding the actual 
social processes of the transition is much more important than tailoring empirical results to fit a 
grand theoretical assertion.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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Table 1 Typology of Workers in Labor Market Transition 
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Table 3. Coefficient Estimates for Linear Regression on Earnings Determination: 
Urban China 1996: Two- Sector Analysis and Four-Group Analysis (N=2079) 
 
 
 
Baseline 
 
Two-sector Analysis  
 
Four-group Analysis  
 
Variables  
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
          
 
Education (years of schooling)   0.048 *** 
(0.009) 
0.057*** 
(0.007)     
 
0.048*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.056*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.047*** 
(0.007) 
 
Experience  
 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.014** 
(0.004) 
 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.012 ** 
(0.004) 
 
Experience squared x1000 
 
-0.217** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.212* 
(0.079) 
 
-0.161* 
(0.072) 
 
-0.215* 
(0.081) 
 
-0.163* 
( 0.075) 
 
Party member (yes=1) 
 
0.099* 
(0.044) 
 
0.144*** 
(0.037) 
 
0.150*** 
(0.037) 
 
0.144*** 
(0.038) 
 
0.150*** 
(0.037) 
 
Gender (male=1) 
 
0.240*** 
(0.042) 
 
0.229*** 
(0.038) 
 
0.222*** 
(0.039) 
 
0.229*** 
(0.037) 
 
0.222*** 
(0.038) 
 
Sector  (market=1)      
- 
 
0.246* 
(0.118) 
 
-0.140 
(0.176) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Type I (stayers [omitted])  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type II (later entrants)    
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.217*** 
(0.057) 
 
-0.150 
(0.163) 
 
Type III (market losers)    
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.076 
(0.104) 
 
-0.084 
(0.486) 
 
Type IV (early birds)   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.275 
(0.212) 
 
-0.131 
(0.330) 
 
Interaction effect:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector*education     
- 
 
- 
 
0.045** 
(0.016) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Type II* education   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
0.044** 
(0.018) 
 
Type III*education   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
-0.0004 
(0.047) 
 
Type IV*education  
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.047 
(0.027) 
 
Constant 
 
5.271*** 
(0.145) 
 
5.112*** 
(0.098) 
 
5.215*** 
(0.102) 
 
5.119*** 
(0.099) 
 
5.222*** 
(0.106) 
 
R square  
 
0.108 
 
0.129 
 
0.137 
 
0.130 
 
0.138 
Notes: figures in parentheses are robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on counties. Data are weighted.    
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05  
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  Table 4. Coefficient Estimates for Linear Regression on Earnings Determination: 
Urban China 1996:  Five-Group Analysis (N=2079) 
 
Variables  
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Education (years of schooling)  
 
0.055*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.049*** 
(0.007) 
 
Experience  
 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
 
Experience squared  *1000 
 
-0.193* 
(0.077) 
 
-0.158 
(0.080) 
 
Party member (yes=1) 
 
0.131*** 
(0.035) 
 
0.135*** 
(0.035) 
 
Gender (male=1) 
 
0.237*** 
(0.035) 
 
0.232*** 
(0.036) 
 
Type I (stayers[omitted])  
 
- 
 
- 
 
Type IIa (involuntary later entrants) 
 
-0.237*** 
(0.050) 
 
-0.335* 
(0.135) 
 
Type IIb (voluntary later entrants) 
 
1.150*** 
(0.067) 
 
0.891*** 
(0.137) 
 
Type III (market losers)  
 
-0.079 
(0.106) 
 
-0.082 
(0.491)   
Type IV (early birds) 
 
0.269 
(0.214) 
 
-0.139 
(0.331) 
 
Interaction effect:  
 
 
 
 
 
Type IIa* education 
 
- 
 
 0.011 
(0.015) 
 
Type IIb* education 
 
- 
 
 0.029* 
(0.015) 
 
Type III*education 
 
- 
 
-0.001 
(0.047) 
 
Type IV*education  
 
- 
 
0.048 
(0.027) 
 
Constant  
 
5.122*** 
(0.088) 
 
5.184*** 
(0.096) 
 
R
2  
 
0.247 
 
0.252 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for clustering on counties. Data are 
weighted.   
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05             William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
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Table 5.  Estimates for Heckman Two-Stage Selection Models on Involuntary and 
Voluntary Market Entrants: Urban China 1996 
  Involuntary Entrants  Voluntary Entrants 
Variables   Model 1 
Probit model 
Model 2 
Linear model 
Model 4 
Probit model 
Model 4 
Linear model  
        
Education (years of schooling)   -0.114*** 
(0.016) 
 0.070*** 
(0.021) 
-0.096*** 
(0.021) 
 0.064** 
(0.022) 
Experience   -0.032* 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
 0.028 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
Experience squared  *1000   0.314 
(0.289) 
 0.032 
(0.235) 
 0.004 
(0.406) 
 0.092 
(0.314) 
Party member (yes=1)  -0.826*** 
(0.186) 
 0.672** 
(0.242) 
-0.390 
(0.201) 
-0.349 
(0.234) 
Gender (male=1)   0.064 
(0.089) 
 0.083 
(0.083) 
-0.045 
(0.113) 
 0.358*** 
(0.106) 
Father’s sector (market=1)    0.219 
(0.201) 
 -0.082 
(0.293) 
 
Marital status    0.213 
(0.147) 
   0.213 
(0.182) 
 
Region (west omitted)       
  Midwest  -0.090 
(0.127) 
 -0.059 
(0.165) 
 
  Northeast   -0.034 
(0.142) 
 -0.267 
(0.200) 
 
  East   -0.245 
(0.142) 
 -0.346 
(0.194) 
 
  Central Municipalities  -0.068 
(0.174) 
   0.283 
(0.199) 
 
  Guangdong    0.848*** 
(0.200) 
   1.338*** 
(0.217) 
 
  Constant    0.225 
(0.250) 
5.590*** 
(0.210) 
-0.225 
(0.318) 
 5.938*** 
(0.216) 
λ  -0.357* 
(0.146) 
   0.236* 
(0.112) 
 
ρ  -0.587   0.461   
N  1708 1618 
Censored Cases   1516 1516 
Model χ
2         113.31           68.38 
DF     10     10 
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors estimated using Heckman procedure in Stata 
7.0.  
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 454 
 
 
42
Figure 1. Illustrative Diagram of Competing Hypotheses in Explaining Higher Returns in 
the Market Sector      
  
Hypothesis 2a 
  Current State Sector  Current Market Sector 
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Type III(Market Losers) 
 
Type IV(Early Birds) 
 
Note:  Shaded area represents type(s) of workers for whom returns to education are especially high.   
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Figure 2: Labor Market Transition and Returns to Education
(Illustrative Diagram)
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Figure 3. Percentages of Urban Workers in the Market Sector: Three Definitions 
Comparison 
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Figure 4. Scatter-plots of Logged Earnings versus Schooling: Voluntary Transition and 
Involuntary Transition to the Market Sector: Urban China 1996 
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Figure 5. Sensitivity Analysis on the Choice of Different Thresholds in Defining Voluntary 
and Involuntary Later Entrants  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: rate is equal to the actual earnings divided by the estimated counterfactual earnings minus 1.    
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